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PAY NOW, EXECUTE LATER: WHY COUNTIES 
SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO POST A BOND TO SEEK 
THE DEATH PENALTY 
Adam M. Gershowitz * 
Since reinstating the death penalty in 1976,1 the Supreme 
Court of the United States has added layer upon layer of proce-
dural regulations to capital cases in the hopes of making the 
death penalty less arbitrary. 2 Yet, while capital punishment is 
heavily regulated, it is practically undisputed that the regulation 
has been a failure. 3 Many scholars believe that death sentences 
are meted out just as arbitrarily today as they were thirty-five 
years ago when the Court imposed a nationwide suspension on 
capital punishment. 4 
With more than thirty years of failed regulation under its belt, 
it seems clear that the Supreme Court is not going to solve the 
arbitrariness problem and that scholars and activists must look 
elsewhere. An idea that is rarely considered is the possibility that 
state legislatures would have an incentive to reform the death 
* Assistant Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law; B.A., 1998, University of 
Delaware; J.D., 2001, University ofVirginia School of Law. I am grateful to Monica Ortale 
for helpful research assistance. 
1. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976). 
2. Today, unlike typical criminal cases, death penalty trials are marked by "super 
due process" protections that give the impression of careful oversight. See Margaret Jane 
Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1983). Consider, for instance, RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH'S, 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (3d ed. 2006) (1100-page textbook), and 
NINA RIVKINO & STEVEN F . SHATZ'S, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEATH PENALTY (2d 
ed. 2005) (900 pages). Both textbooks focus on death penalty decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
3. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on 
Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 
360 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme Court's death penalty law "creates an impression of 
enormous regulatory effort but achieves negligible regulatory effects"). 
4. See, e.g., DAVID R. DOW, EXECUTED ON A TECHNICALITY: LETHAL INJUSTICE ON 
AMERICA'S DEATH ROW, at xxii-xxiii (2005). 
861 
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penalty process themselves. 5 In this article, I argue that state leg-
islatures, acting completely out of self-interest, could create a 
more fair and efficient death penalty system by requiring local 
county prosecutors, who handle most capital cases, to post a cash 
bond in order to seek the death penalty. In turn, legislatures 
could force counties to forfeit that bond if the capital prosecution 
is unsuccessful at trial or on appeal. 
Allow me to take a step back to set the stage. Most death pen-
alty cases are prosecuted at the county level, and there are great 
disparities between the counties. For example, while Texas is well 
known as the most frequent user of the death penalty, 6 capital 
cases are not initiated by the Texas Attorney General's office but 
instead by a handful of Texas's 254 counties. 7 While a majority of 
Texas counties have not sought a single death sentence during 
the last three decades, 8 Harris County-which includes the City 
of Houston-consistently has sought the death penalty more than 
a dozen times per year. 9 Similarly, a disproportionate number of 
capital prosecutions in the State of Pennsylvania are instigated 
by the Philadelphia County District Attorney; 10 most Illinois 
5. Professors Ron Wright and Doug Berman have long argued that scholars put too 
much emphasis on court-based solutions, while plausible legislative solutions are right 
under our noses. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Foreword: Addressing Capital Punishment 
Through Statutory Reform, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 10 (2002) (lamenting that too much focus is 
placed on the Supreme Court and suggesting that we "turn to legislatures to find some 
hope within an otherwise discouraging story about the reform of capital systems"); Ronald 
F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 
90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 223 (2004) (arguing that indigent defense funding is more likely to 
improve if the reform comes from legislatures rather than the judiciary). 
6. TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PuNISHMENT, 2005, at 1, 11 
(2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp05.pdf (collecting state death 
penalty statistics for 2005 and 2006). 
7. See Mike Tolson, A Deadly Distinction: Part II; Between Life and Death: Border-
line Capital Cases Raise Questions of Justice, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 5, 2001, at Al. 
8. See id. (explaining that between 1976 and 2000, 138 of Texas's 254 counties never 
sought the death penalty and that another 53 counties sought death only once). 
9. See Mike Tolson & Steve Brewer, Harris County Is a Pipeline to Death Row. A 
Four-Part Series Examines Why, and Explores Whether Justice Is Served; A Deadly Dis-
tinction, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 4, 2001, at A1; see also Eric Berger, Olympics Bid Confronts 
Death Penalty; Boosters of 2012 Games in Houston Dismiss Capital Punishment as Issue, 
Hous. CHRON., May 28, 2000, at A37 ("Since the death penalty was re-instated in 1976, 
Harris County has sent more prisoners to their deaths-64-than all states except Texas 
and Virginia."). But cf Lianne Hart, Texas Is Sending Fewer to Death Row, L.A. TIMES, 
Dec. 11, 2006, at All (discussing various reasons for decline in Texas's death penalty 
prosecutions in 2006). 
10. See Tina Rosenberg, The Deadliest D.A., N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1995, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 22. 
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cases come from Chicago's Cook County; 11 and so the story goes 
throughout the country. 12 
By seeking the death penalty often, a handful of counties send 
a disproportionate number of defendants to death row. Moreover, 
as Professor James Liebman and his colleagues have found, those 
jurisdictions that use the death penalty more frequently tend to 
make more mistakes, thus leading to more appellate reversals. 13 
Given that counties have wide latitude to seek the death pen-
alty (and sometimes use that latitude in marginal, or even inap-
propriate, cases), any solution to the arbitrariness problem must 
create an incentive for counties to choose their death penalty 
cases more carefully and more sparingly. State legislatures can 
create that incentive by requiring local county prosecutors to post 
a cash bond and transmit the money to the state treasury before 
filing capital charges. 14 
If the county prosecutors were successful in procuring a death 
sentence and preserving that sentence on appeal, then the bond 
would be returned to the county with interest. Thus, the county 
would suffer no penalty15 for seeking the death penalty in truly 
heinous cases; those in which it was obvious that a jury would re-
turn a death sentence, and in which the prosecutors did not have 
to push the envelope and risk an appellate reversal in order to 
win a conviction. By contrast, if county prosecutors chose mar-
ginal cases in which juries refused to sentence the defendant to 
death, or if prosecutors had to pull out all of the stops to procure 
death sentences, leading to reversals on appeal, then the county 
11. Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Region, and Death Sentencing in llli· 
nois, 1988-1997, 81 OR. L. REV. 39, 92 tb1.25 (2002) (studying the period between 1988 and 
1997). 
12. For a more detailed discussion, see Adam M. Gershowitz, Imposing a Cap on Capi· 
tal Punishment, 72 Mo. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 3-5, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=905332). 
13. JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS SO MUCH 
ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT, 349-50 (2002), available at 
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem21 ("[T]he more death verdicts per homicides 
a county imposes, the higher its capital-error rates are likely to rise .... Jurisdictions that 
reserve the death penalty for only the very worst offenses do the best job of avoiding seri-
ous, capital error and the risks and costs that go with it."). 
14. The bond could reflect the significant amount of money the state-as opposed to 
the county government-normally shoulders in handling appeals of death sentences. See 
infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text. 
15. Of course, the county would lose the ability to immediately use the bond money 
while the case is pending on appeal. 
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would forfeit the bond to the state. Facing the obligation to post a 
large sum of money ex ante, and the possibility of never having 
that money returned, county prosecutors would have an incentive 
to seek the death penalty in only the worst of the worst cases, and 
an incentive to try those cases in a manner that gives every bene-
fit of the doubt to the defendant so that the death sentence will 
stand up on appeal. 16 
Requiring counties to post a bond would be a simple, yet stark, 
change from the current death penalty framework in most states. 
Currently, in most jurisdictions, counties initially fund the hefty 
costs of capital prosecutions, but they pass responsibility (and the 
bill) to state governments to handle most or even all of the very 
costly appellate and habeas corpus petitions 17 that capital peti-
tioners file for years after trial. 18 Thus, under the current system, 
when counties choose their capital cases poorly, they are not 
forced to internalize the substantial post-trial costs associated 
with their errors. 19 Instead, the states are forced to foot a large 
part of the bill. 
16. Many counties currently spend large sums of money on capital prosecutions and 
appear not to be concerned about the reversals. See Robert M. Bohm, The Economic Costs 
of Capital Punishment: Past, Present, and Future, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH 
CAPITAL PuNISHMENT 573, 576-82 (James R. Acker et a!. eds., 2d ed. 2003) (discussing 
added pre-trial and trial expenses associated with capital cases); Russell Gold, Counties 
Struggle With High Cost of Prosecuting Death-Penalty Cases, WALL ST. J. , Jan. 9, 2002, at 
B1 (recounting a 6.7% property tax increase to pay for death penalty trials arising out of 
the murder of James Byrd). Counties' behavior might change, however, if they were re-
quired to pay specified costs ex ante. 
17. See Bohm, supra note 16, at 582 ("The post-trial stage generally is the most ex-
pensive part of the entire process.") (citing RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
IN AMERICA 212 (1991)). 
18. See, e.g ., OFFICE OF VICTIM AsSISTANCE, OFFICE OF THE ATI"Y GEN. OF ALA., A 
GUIDEBOOK TO ALABAMA'S DEATH PENALTY APPEALS PROCESS 6-7, available at http:// 
www.ago.state.al .us/documents/deathpenalty.pdf; OFFICE OF THE VICTIMS' SERVS., OFFICE 
OF THE ATI"Y GEN. OF CAL., A VICTIM'S GUIDE TO THE CAPITAL CASE PROCESS 2 (2000), 
available at http://ag.ca.gov/victimservices/pdf/deathpen.pdf; POST CONVICTION LITIG. DIV., 
OFFICE OF THE ATI"Y GEN. OF TEX., CAPITAL PuNISHMENT APPELLATE GUIDEBOOK 2 (2006), 
available at http://www.oag.state.tx.us/AG_Publications/pdfs/appellate2006.pdf ("In fed-
eral court, the Attorney General represents both the State's and victim's interest."); 
VICTIM NOTIFICATION PROGRAM, OFFICE OF THE ATI"Y GEN. OF VA., THE APPELLATE 
PROCESS FOR A VmGINIA CAPITAL MURDER CONVICTION 1, available at http://oag.state. 
va. us/KEY _ISSUES/VICTIM_NOTIFICATION/capmurder. pdf. 
19. See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 
2127 (2000) ("[T)he penalty for error by trial-level prosecutors and judges never requires 
them to bear the huge financial costs of the lengthy post-conviction process that the error 
imposed on state-level states' attorneys and judges."). 
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The virtue of the bond proposal is that it leaves discretion in 
the hands of local prosecutors to determine which capital cases 
they want to pursue while forcing them to take full responsibility 
for those decisions. By requiring counties to post (and risk forfeit-
ing) a bond commensurate with the states' costs, state legisla-
tures would be telling the counties to: 
Go ahead and seek the death penalty as often as you like. If you are 
successful the state will cover the expensive appellate and postcon-
viction costs. But if you are unsuccessful, then you will forfeit a cash 
bond to compensate the state for the expenses it paid with respect to 
your failed capital prosecutions. 
Obviously, counties that make frequent use of the death pen-
alty would lobby against any such proposal. Yet, the proposal 
should be appealing to state legislators on at least two levels. 
First, many legislators care about the racial, economic, and geo-
graphic arbitrariness of the death penalty and would welcome 
legislation that has a chance of curbing those unfortunate reali-
ties. 20 Second, and perhaps more significant in times of tight 
budgets, legislators frequently seek ways to find money that could 
be used for other projects. If the legislature were to set the cash 
bond for capital cases at $300,000, and if the bond were forfeited 
in ten cases per year, then the state would have·an additional $3 
million to spend on education, healthcare, or other projects. Thus, 
legislatures would be saving money for their states by charging 
counties for failed capital appeals, while at the same time re-
maining tough on crime by paying for the costs of successful capi-
tal appeals. 
Part I of this article briefly reviews the Supreme Court's failed 
efforts to eliminate the arbitrary use of the death penalty. Part I 
also discusses how certain counties seek the death penalty dra-
matically more often than comparable jurisdictions and "overpro-
duce" death by procuring many death sentences that are reversed 
on appeal and never result in executions. 21 Because states typi-
20. Consider the tireless efforts of Texas State Senator Rodney Ellis, who has intro-
duced legislation to establish an innocence commission in Texas and to provide better rep-
resentation for indigent defendants. See Howard Witt, Texas Urged to Probe Claims of 
Wrongful Executions, CHI. TRIB., July 7, 2006, at 6 (discussing how Sen. Ellis introduced 
two bills to study past death penalty cases); Rodney Ellis & Hanna Liebman Dershowitz, 
Gideon's Promise: The Texas Story, CHAMPION, Apr. 2003, at 61 (discussing the Fair De-
fense Act, a bill also sponsored by Sen. Ellis). 
21. See Liebman, supra note 19, at 2056-57 ("What most condemned men and women 
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cally handle the expensive appellate and postconviction petitions, 
these counties never fully internalize the costs of their failed 
death penalty prosecutions. Part II proposes that legislatures re-
quire counties to post a cash bond before seeking the death pen-
alty, and that the bond be forfeited if a county's efforts to procure 
an execution fail. Part II additionally suggests two possible stat-
utes that legislatures could adopt to implement the proposal-one 
that provides for total forfeiture of the bond in all failed prosecu-
tions, and one that graduates the forfeiture amount depending on 
the stage in which the capital prosecution failed. Part III then 
discusses the incentives legislatures would have to enact this 
proposal. In particular, Part III discusses the high costs states 
pay for capital appeals. Part III also explains that, despite the 
need to be "tough on crime," legislatures have been reducing cor-
rections funding in recent years to ensure that other government 
priorities are funded. Legislators who realize how much money 
failed county death penalty prosecutions are costing state taxpay-
ers would have an incentive to put the onus on county prosecutors 
to assume the financial risks associated with their capital prose-
cutions. 
I. STILL ARBITRARY AFTER ALL THESE YEARS 
A. The Court's Efforts to Regulate the Death Penalty 
The modern era of death penalty jurisprudence began in 1976 
when the Supreme Court reinstated capital punishment. In Gregg 
v. Georgia, 22 the Supreme Court indicated that states could create 
a constitutional death penalty framework by providing "for a bi-
furcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised 
of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and pro-
vided with standards to guide its use of the information."23 In 
that connection, the Court has required that defendants be per-
mitted to introduce any evidence that mitigates against a death 
sentence, even if such evidence is not contemplated by the gov-
do after being sentenced to die is wait-for eleven years on average. And what most of 
them, in reality, are waiting for is not execution, but reversal of their capital judgments 
because of serious legal error."). 
22. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
23. ld. at 195. 
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erning statute. 24 Conversely, the Court also has devoted consid-
erable attention to the aggravating circumstances that make de-
fendants eligible for the death penalty by requiring that the ag-
gravating circumstances be clearly defined, 25 by prohibiting the 
consideration of aggravating factors that are not disclosed to the 
defendant, 26 and by demanding that aggravating circumstances 
be found by the jury rather than a judge. 27 
In addition to dealing with the types of evidence presented to 
juries, the Court has heavily regulated the process of selecting 
capital juries. In a series of decisions, the Court tinkered with the 
standard for removing prospective jurors who are opposed to the 
death penalty. 28 It also set standards for removing jurors who 
would never impose the death penalty, 29 and it considered chal-
lenges that juries composed of death penalty supporters were in-
herently biased toward conviction. 30 
The Court also has devoted considerable attention to the ade-
quacy of representation received by indigent defendants. In a long 
series of cases, the Court has attempted to define how much in-
vestigation competent counsel are required to undertake to be ef-
fective during the sentencing phase of capital trials. 31 It has also 
24. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
25. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361-64 (1988); QQdfrey v. Georgia, 446 
u.s. 420, 427-33 (1980). 
26. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) ("[The defendant] was denied due 
process of law when the death sentence was imposed ... on the basis of information which 
he had no opportunity to deny or explain."). 
27. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). 
28. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 419 (1985) (noting that a juror need not 
harbor "unmistakably clear" bias against the death penalty to be excluded); Adams v. 
Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980) (finding it impermissible to exclude a juror "based on his 
views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair 
the performance of his duties"); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-22 (1968) (hold-
ing that juror cannot be excluded "simply because they voiced general objections to the 
death penalty"). 
29. See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728 (1992) ("[A] juror who in no case would 
vote for capital punishment, regardless of his or her instructions, is not an impartial juror 
and must be removed for cause."). 
30. See Lockhart v. McCree, 4 76 U.S. 162, 178, 183-84 (1986) (rejecting the chal-
lenge); Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517-18 (refusing to adopt a "per se constitutional rule" 
that would reverse convictions when potential jurors who opposed the death penalty were 
excluded from the jury). 
31. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383-86 (2005) (finding ineffective assistance 
of counsel for failing to examine the court file from the defendant's prior conviction, which 
contained mitigating material); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524-26 (2003) (finding 
ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel conducted an inadequate investigation "re-
sult[ing] from inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment" that failed to discover power-
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sought to carve out an area of presumptively valid representation 
based on lawyers' strategic choices at trial. 32 
In the substantive realm, the Court has forbidden the execu-
tion of juveniles, 33 the mentally retarded, 34 certain rapists, 35 and 
certain felony murders. 36 Yet, even these seemingly simple sub-
stantive restrictions on capital punishment have spawned com-
plicated new areas of death penalty jurisprudence. While it is 
usually clear whether a defendant was under eighteen years of 
age at the time of his crime, it is not always clear whether a de-
fendant was mentally retarded. And in that connection, the Su-
preme Court has opened the door to a maze of litigation about 
who is in fact mentally retarded. 37 
Put simply, the Court has created a large body of procedural 
regulations to govern the death penalty, providing capital peti-
tioners with numerous theories to appeal their sentences. 38 Yet, 
as explained below, the Court's efforts have been a failure. 39 
ful mitigating evidence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395-96 (2000) (finding ineffec-
tive counsel where counsel's failure to introduce "voluminous" mitigating evidence was 
"not justified by a tactical decision"); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 
( 1984) (setting a two part test standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims). 
32. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794-95 (1987) (finding that counsel's trial 
strategy was "supported by reasonable professional judgment"); Darden v. Wainwright, 
477 U.S. 168, 184-87 (1986) (relying on counsel's reasonable choices). 
33. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) ("The Eight and Fourteenth 
Amendments forbid the imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the 
age of 18 when their crimes were committed."). 
34. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) ("[D]eath is not a suitable pun-
ishment for a mentally retarded criminal."). 
35. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (forbidding the death penalty for 
the rape of adult women stating "a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and ex-
cessive punishment for the crime of rape"). 
36. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797-98 (1982) (concluding that the death 
penalty is inappropriate for one who aids and abets a felony murder). 
37. Compare Stephen B. Brauerman, Comment, Balancing the Burden: The Constitu-
tional Justification for Requiring the Government to Prove the Absence of Mental Retarda-
tion Before Imposing the Death Penalty, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 401, 403 (2004) (arguing that 
"the Constitution requires the govemment to prove the absence of mental retardation" in 
order for the death penalty to be imposed), with Bill Lockyer & Taylor S. Carey, Capital 
Punishment and the Mentally Retarded: Implementing Atkins, 15 STAN. L. & POL 'y REV. 
329, 340 (2004) (intimating that defendants should bear the burden ofprooO. 
38. At the same time that the Court has created a variety of procedural rules that 
capital petitioners can invoke, the Court has made it very difficult for petitioners to suc-
cessfully exercise those procedural guarantees and receive a ruling on the merits of their 
cases. Indeed, even before Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No 109-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections and titles of U.S.C.), which drastically restricted the availability of ha-
beas corpus, see id. §§ 101-108, the Supreme Court had streamlined the availability of ha-
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B. Arbitrariness Continues 
Three decades after the Supreme Court reinstated capital pun-
ishment and adopted a complicated series of procedures to regu-
late it, critics still find much to criticize about the American 
death penalty system. Critics seize on the fact that in the thirty 
years since Gregg, 123 individuals have been exonerated and 
freed from death rows across the country. 40 Many of these indi-
viduals were exonerated not as a result of judicial inquiries but 
because journalism students or other activists brought their cases 
to public light. 41 Scholars explain that the dozens of death pen-
alty decisions laid down by the Court have done little or nothing 
to protect the innocent from being convicted or to provide an ave-
nue for the wrongfully convicted to exonerate themselves on ap-
peal.42 To the contrary, the Court's fractured 1993 decision in 
Herrera v. Collins 43 forbade freestanding claims of actual inno-
cence from being brought in habeas corpus petitions and ap-
peared to authorize the execution of actually innocent defendants 
who could not demonstrate a cognizable constitutional violation 
beas corpus in both capital and non-capital cases. See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, 
Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 5-6 (1997) (ex-
plaining that during the 1980s and 1990s the Supreme Court succeeded in narrowing the 
availability of habeas corpus long before Congress passed AEDPA). The Court has made it 
very difficult for petitioners who failed to raise issues in state court to have those issues 
reviewed on the merits in federal court. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 90-91 
(1977) (imposing a "cause-and-prejudice" test for procedural default in federal court). The 
Court also has adopted a complicated (and largely insurmountable) test for applying new 
rules of criminal procedure to individuals whose convictions are final. See Teague v. Lane, 
489 U.S. 288, 311-316 (1989) (holding that habeas petitioners cannot benefit from new 
rules of criminal procedure except if the new rule prescribes the ability to criminalize con-
duct or if the new rule is a watershed rule of criminal procedure). 
39. For a compelling criticism of the Court's efforts to reduce arbitrariness, see Scott 
W. Howe, The Failed Case for Eighth Amendment Regulation of the Capital-Sentencing 
Trial, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 795 (1998). 
40. Henry Weinstein, North Carolina to Weigh Claims of Innocence, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
4, 2006 at 18; Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence and the Death Penalty, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=412&scid=6 (last visited Apr. 10, 2007) 
(compiling death penalty exoneration statistics). 
41. See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Class of Sleuths to Rescue on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
5, 1999, at A16 (discussing research by Northwestern University journalism students that 
led to the exoneration of deathrow inmate); Don Terry, DNA Tests and a Confession Set 
Three on the Path to Freedom in 1978 Murders, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1996, at A6 (same). 
42. See George C. Thomas III et al., Is It Ever Too Late for Innocence? Finality, Effi-
ciency, and Claims of Innocence, 64 U. Prrr. L. REV. 263, 267 (2003) ("It appears that the 
Supreme Court has neglected the most important 'do-no-harm' value of the criminal jus-
tice system: to separate the innocent from the guilty."). 
43. 506 u.s. 390 (1993). 
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such as ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial miscon-
duct.44 
While innocence has been a call to arms, Professor David Dow 
has observed recently-and correctly-that innocence is primarily 
a distraction from the more prevalent flaws that continue to per-
vade the death penalty system. 45 Most notable is the continuing 
problem of racial discrimination in capital punishment. Although 
the days of white mobs lynching black citizens are long since 
gone, 46 racial discrimination remains pervasive, and death rows 
continue to be filled with a disproportionate number of minority 
offenders. 47 In numerous studies, Professor David Baldus and 
other scholars have documented the continued widespread racial 
discrimination in capital sentencing throughout the country. 48 
The Court's procedural regulation of the death penalty has done 
little to reduce the racial discrimination problem over the last 
thirty years. Indeed, when an equal protection challenge based on 
Professor Baldus's data reached the Court in 1987, the Court spe-
cifically rejected it out-of-hand. 49 
Another systematic problem which predates the Gregg decision 
and which still exists today is the inadequate representation af-
forded to indigent capital defendants. Although the Supreme 
44. See id. at 400 ("Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence 
have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent 
constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding."). For criti-
cism of Herrera, see Susan Bandes, Simple Murder: A Comment on the Legality of Execut-
ing the Innocent, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 501 (1996). 
45. See David R. Dow, Op-Ed, The End of Innocence, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2006, at 
A31 ("Innocence is a distraction ... [Abolitionists] ought to focus on the far more pervasive 
problem: that the machinery of death in America is lawless, and in carrying out death sen-
tences, we violate our legal principles nearly all of the time."); see also Carol S. Steiker & 
Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and Limitations of the Fo-
cus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
587, 623 (2005). 
46. See JAMES R. MCGoVERN, ANATOMY OF A LYNCHING: THE KILLING OF CLAUDE 
NEAL 1-15 (1982) (providing an historical overview oflynching in the United States). 
47. See, e.g., John M. Baer, Faulkner, Mumia in Mix; State Senate Hearing Set on 
Moratorium for Death Penalty, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 21, 2000, at 7 (stating that 111 of 
the 126 death row inmates from Philadelphia are African-American or Hispanic). 
48. See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 401 
(1990) (describing the results of a long-term study showing that a defendant's odds of be-
ing sentenced to death were 4.3 times higher if the victim was white); David C. Baldus, et 
al., Racial Discrimination in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, 
with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1661 (1998) (explain-
ing that in 96% of the states where there have been reviews of race and the death penalty, 
there was a pattern of either race-of-victim or race-of-defendant discrimination or both). 
49. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297-99 (1987). 
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Court has recently imposed slightly more rigorous review on inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims, 50 few would dispute that poor 
capital defendants are often represented by appointed lawyers 
who are unqualified or overworked. 51 Thus, the poor are far more 
likely to be sentenced to death than those who can afford their 
own counsel. 52 
Another troubling problem continues to be the geographic arbi-
trariness associated with the imposition of capital punishment. A 
handful of states produce most of the nation's death sentences, 
and an even smaller number of states are responsible for most of 
the actual executions. Between 1973 and 2004, southern states 
accounted for more than 60% of the nation's death sentences and 
more than 82% of its executions. 53 Among the southern states, 
Texas and Virginia accounted for 43% of the nation's executions. 54 
By contrast, northeastern states accounted for only about six per-
cent of the country's death sentences and well under one percent 
of its executions. 55 
The disparities, however, are not simply regional. As noted 
above, there are Texas counties that never seek the death pen-
50. See Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Litigation of Ineffective Assistance Claims: Some 
Uncomfortable Reflections on Massaro v. United States, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 793, 804 (2004) 
("A majority of the Court seems to have serious concerns about the ineffective assistance 
problem. Two recent decisions have taken a surprisingly rigorous view of the Strickland 
test.") (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 
(2000)). 
51. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst 
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1857-66 (1994) (lamenting the abys-
mal representation provided to many capital defendants); see also Vivian Berger, The Chi-
ropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 245, 249 (1990) (stating that capital defendants frequently "are represented by 
the incompetent or inexperienced"); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of 
"Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 489-94 (1993) (discussing the 
unavailability of lawyers qualified to represent capital defendants); Douglas W. Vick, 
Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 
43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 397-98 (1995) (stating that a lack of funding discourages qualified 
counsel from taking appointments in death penalty cases). 
52. See Bright, supra note 51, at 1883 (summarizing the argument that the death 
penalty is often imposed "not upon those who commit the worst crimes, but upon those 
who have the misfortune to be assigned the worst lawyers."). 
53. See Gershowitz, supra note 12, at 24-25. 
54. See THOMAS P. BONCZAR & TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT, 2004, at 16 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp04. 
pdf. 
55. See Gershowitz, supra note 12, at 24-25. Even more startling, of the northern 
states, Pennsylvania accounted for more than 83% of the region's death sentences and all 
of its executions. See id. at 25. 
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alty, even as Harris County, home to Houston, sentenced more 
than 200 people to death between 1976 and 2000. 56 In Pennsyl-
vania, Philadelphia County has sent well over 100 individuals to 
death row, while comparably sized Pittsburgh has sent very 
few. 57 Similar disparities have been documented between Cincin-
nati and Columbus, Ohio; New York City and upstate New York; 
Memphis and Nashville, Tennessee; and the Baltimore suburbs 
and Baltimore City. 58 
By discussing arbitrariness problems associated with inno-
cence, race, class, and geography, I do not mean to suggest that 
the judiciary is absent from the supervision of capital punish-
ment. To the contrary, the judiciary exercises vigorous oversight 
to ensure compliance with the procedural protections laid down 
by the Supreme Court over the last three decades. Professor 
James Liebman and his colleagues have found that a staggering 
sixty-eight percent of capital trials conducted between 1973 and 
1995 were reversed on appeal. 59 As Professor Liebman explained, 
death sentences are "overproduced;" up to six death sentences are 
handed down for each execution that is actually carried out. 60 
Nevertheless, appellate review has not made a dent in the core 
arbitrariness problems associated with the death penalty: the in-
nocent are still sentenced to death; being poor drastically in-
creases the odds of execution; racial discrimination still pervades 
the system; and the likelihood of being sentenced to death often 
depends on which side of the county line the defendant committed 
his crime. Ultimately, the Court's strict supervision of capital 
punishment has resulted in petitioners spending tremendous 
56. See Tolson, supra note 7. 
57. See Gershowitz, supra note 12, at 28-29; see also Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting 
Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 
HARv. C.R.·C.L. L. REV. 339, 344 n.21 (2006) (explaining that Philadelphia represents 
thirteen percent of the state population but over half of the death row inmates); William 
C. Smith, A Tale of Two Cities, LEGAL lNTELLIGENCER, Jan. 15, 1997, at 1 ("[The) Phila-
delphia D.A.'s office is much more aggressive in seeking the death penalty."). 
58. See Gershowitz, supra note 12, at 27-30 (discussing the disparities in greater de-
tail). 
59. James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-
1995, at 4-5 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper 
No. 15, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=232712 (concluding that courts found 
reversible error in sixty-eight percent of death sentences that were fully reviewed on the 
merits). 
60. See Liebman, supra note 19, at 2048. 
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time wrangling their way through procedural hurdles, while 
courts spend very little time on the actual merits of the cases. 61 
II. REQUIRING COUNTY PROSECUTORS TO POST A BOND 
Given that the Court's efforts to reduce the arbitrariness of the 
death penalty, through procedural regulations and a handful of 
substantive restrictions, have proved to be a failure, it is time to 
consider another approach. Because many academics tend to be 
court-focused, 62 they devote little attention to the prospect of leg-
islatures, rather than the judiciary, imposing restrictions that 
could improve the functioning of the death penalty. 63 
There are a number of ways state legislatures could try to clean 
up the death penalty mess. States could restrict the number64 or 
types65 of cases that are statutorily eligible for the death penalty, 
impose a higher burden of proof in capital cases, 66 or provide 
greater avenues for post-trial review. 67 Yet, while these proposals 
may have some merit, no state legislatures have taken the bait. 
Perhaps the explanation for the lack of interest is that the pro-
posals are not politically viable; each might be a political earth-
quake that would place unpopular obstacles in the way of execu-
61. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 3, at 429 (calling the Court's death penalty ju-
risprudence a "fa~ade" that serves more to make "the public at large more comfortable 
with the death penalty" than with providing actual protection to defendants). 
62. I tend to be guilty of this as well. In a recent article, I suggested that the Court 
could fix the arbitrariness problem if it would scrap its current jurisprudence and instead 
cap death penalty prosecutions for each jurisdiction at the national average. See Gershow-
itz, supra note 12, at 7. 
63. See Berman, supra note 5, at 10 (noting that "we now may be able to tum to legis-
latures to find some hope" for reform). 
64. Cf. Gershowitz, supra note 12, at 7 (suggesting that the Supreme Court cap death 
penalty prosecutions at the national average). 
65. See LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 394-95 (raising the possibility of limiting 
the death penalty to crimes of the magnitude of September 11th and the Oklahoma City 
bombing). 
66. See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, A (Genuinely) Modest Proposal Concerning the Death 
Penalty, 72 IND. L.J. 25, 27 (1996); Margery Malkin Koosed, Averting Mistaken Executions 
by Adopting the Model Penal Code's Exclusion of Death in the Presence of Lingering Doubt, 
21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 41, 111-12 (2001); Hon. Leonard B. Sand & Danielle L. Rose, Proof 
Beyond All Possible Doubt: Is There a Need for a Higher Burden of Proof When the Sen· 
tence May Be Death?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1359, 1361 (2003); Elizabeth R. Jungman, 
Note, Beyond All Doubt, 91 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1089-91 (2003). 
67. See Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 285 ("An-
other potential solution is to create procedures that would treat postconviction claims of 
innocence separately from other claims."). 
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tions without creating any immediately noticeable benefits. In 
place of these less palatable approaches, I offer a more modest 
proposal: the requirement that prosecutors post a bond before 
seeking the death penalty. 
In most criminal cases, states delegate prosecutorial responsi-
bility to the counties. Thus, it is the county prosecutor who rises 
in open court to say, "The State is ready to proceed, Your Honor." 
I do not propose to change that arrangement in capital cases, but 
simply to have the states impose a monetary restriction on the 
counties. In recognition of the fact that states often have to shoul-
der high costs to defend the counties' death sentences on appeal, 
and that many of those death sentences do not survive on appeal, 
state legislatures should require county prosecutors to post a 
bond to cover the states' appellate costs. 
The rationale for requiring county prosecutors to post a bond is 
comparable to the reason society requires criminal defendants to 
post bond. Judges force defendants to post bond to encourage 
them to show up for trial. 68 In essence, defendants must post 
bond because society does not trust them to act properly without 
the prospect of losing money hanging over their heads. The same 
logic easily could apply to county prosecutors. If prosecutors want 
to seek the death penalty, society should not prevent them, but it 
should create an incentive to guarantee they will behave properly 
by bringing only meritorious cases and litigating them in a man-
ner that is extremely unlikely to result in reversal on appeal. Be-
low, I offer two types of bond statutes that state legislatures could 
adopt. 
A. The AU-Or-Nothing Approach 
The first proposal is what could be called the "ali-or-nothing" 
approach. In every capital case, county prosecutors could be re-
quired to post a bond by. sending a predetermined sum of money 
to the state treasury. If the defendant is executed, the state would 
promptly return the entire bond, plus interest, to the county. If 
the jury refuses to hand down a death sentence, or if the death 
sentence is reversed on appeal, 69 then the county would forfeit 
68. See Daniel Richman, United States v. Salerno: The Constitutionality of Regulatory 
Detention, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 414 (CarolS. Steiker ed. 2006). 
69. At first blush, observers might worry that appellate lawyers in the attorney gen-
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the entire bond, plus all accrued interest, to the state. 70 While 
called an "ali-or-nothing'' proposal, there would have to be two ex-
ceptions for situations beyond counties' control. First, a county 
should be entitled to a refund of its bond, plus interest, in the 
event that the governor or state pardon board grants an inmate 
clemency 71 for a reason other than prosecutorial misconduct. 72 
Second, if the inmate dies prematurely in prison before his ap-
peals have run their course-a process which currently takes an 
average of more than ten years 73-the county should be entitled 
to a refund of its bond, plus interest, based on the presumption 
that the death sentence would have been carried out. 74 
eral's office would have an incentive to "throw" death penalty appeals because reversals 
would result in more money being brought into state, rather than county, coffers. This 
possibility is highly unlikely, however, because litigators, whether trial or appellate and 
whether state or county employees, want to win, particularly in capital cases. Prevailing 
on a capital appeal is personally satisfying to lawyers in the attorney general's office and 
helps to enhance their reputations, thus giving them a chance to climb the ladder to a 
higher position. See, e.g., Norman Lefstein, Reform of Defense Representation in Capital 
Cases: The Indiana Experience and Its Implications for the Nation, 29 IND. L. REV. 495, 
511 (1996) ("[A] prosecutor does not want to risk losing [capital cases] because that gener-
ates negative publicity and is seen as a 'knock on the prosecutor.'"). 
70. Observers also might contend that forcing small counties to post a large cash bond 
ex ante would deter them from seeking the death penalty in meritorious cases. There is 
some risk of this, but examples abound of small counties prosecuting egregious capital 
cases in the face of huge costs. See Gold, supra note 16; see also infra Part II. C. If high 
trial costs do not deter counties from seeking the death penalty in the occasional egregious 
case, the requirement to post an additional cash bond likely would not deter them either. 
Instead, the proposal is aimed at deterring jurisdictions that seek the death penalty in 
numerous marginal cases where the cost of posting multiple cash bonds would be a greater 
deterrent. 
71. With the exception of Illinois, grants of clemency have been rare events in capital 
cases in the last few decades. See, e.g., AUSTIN SARAT, MERCY ON TRIAL: WHAT IT MEANS 
TO STOP AN EXECUTION 33 (2005) ("Today capital clemency is an endangered species."). 
72. The classic case of prosecutorial misconduct would be the failure to turn over ex-
culpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Other examples 
include using peremptory challenges based on race or gender, suborning peijury, coercing 
witnesses, fabricating evidence, and making false statements to the jury. See JIM DWYER 
ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FlVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE 
WRONGLY CONVICTED 172-82 (2000) (discussing various instances of prosecutorial mis-
conduct). 
73. See BONCZAR & SNELL, supra note 54, at 11 & tbl.ll. 
74. This presumption runs counter, at least in part, to the abatement doctrine, 
whereby the record of a defendant who dies before his initial appeal has been resolved is 
wiped clean. See Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971) (per curiam) ("[D]eath 
pending direct review of a criminal conviction abates not only the appeal but also all pro-
ceedings had in the prosecution from its inception."). The death offormer Enron Chairman 
Ken Lay following his conviction has renewed discussion of the appropriateness of the 
abatement doctrine. See Kristin Hays, Prosecutors Drop Lay Appeal; Government With-
draws Notice to Challenge Ruling Clearing Record, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 21, 2006, at Bus. 
1. 
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The ali-or-nothing approach has the virtue of being a fairly 
simple bright-line rule. Counties would have to decide at the out-
set whether they believe they will be successful at trial and on 
appeal. If the prosecutors think there is some risk of an acquittal, 
a life sentence, or an appellate reversal, then they would have to 
weigh whether seeking the death penalty is worth the financial 
risk of losing the bond. 
An additional benefit of the ali-or-nothing approach would be to 
promote truth-in-charging. Today, prosecutors occasionally seek 
the death penalty in the hopes of encouraging the defendant to 
plead guilty to a charge carrying a lengthy prison sentence. 75 
Critics have long railed against this practice as too heavy-
handed, 76 and they have proposed policies encouraging prosecu-
tors to file charges only for those crimes for which they truly be-
lieve they can secure convictions. 77 While plea bargaining is likely 
to remain alive and well in run-of-the-mill criminal cases, impos-
ing a bond requirement in capital cases would greatly restrict the 
most heavy-handed bargaining. 
Relatedly, critics have also asserted that prosecutors who do 
not actually desire a death sentence sometimes seek the death 
penalty because a death-qualified jury78 is more likely to convict 
75. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970) (upholding a guilty plea by a 
defendant who claimed to be innocent and who only pled guilty to avoid the death pen-
alty); MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN 
CAPITAL CASES 163 (1992) (quoting defendant who plead guilty to avoid the death penalty 
as saying that prosecutors "told me ifl pleaded guilty, I'd only get maybe a couple of years. 
If I didn't, I'd go to the chair for sure."); EMILY WILSON, ET AL., TENNESSEE'S DEATH 
PENALTY: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES, 13 (July 2004), available at http://www.comptroller. 
state.tn.us/orea/reports/deathpenalty.pdf ("[S]urveys and interviews indicate that [other 
prosecutors] use the death penalty as a 'bargaining chip' to secure plea bargains for lesser 
sentences."); Liebman, supra note 19, at 2097 ("[Capital punishment] provides the best 
plea-bargaining leverage imaginable."). For an empirical assessment, see Ilyana 
Kuziemko, Does the Threat of the Death Penalty Affect Plea Bargaining in Murder Cases? 
Evidence From New York's 1995 Reinstatement of Capital Punishment, 8 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 116, 140 (2006) ("The findings here suggest that the threat of the death penalty leads 
more defendants to plead guilty to their original arraignment charges."). 
76. See Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1998, at 125, 142-43 ("It seems that innocent defendants 
will almost always risk additional years of their lives in order to seek vindication rather 
than accept disgrace coupled with a long term of imprisonment, but some will not go so far 
as to risk death."). 
77. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial 
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 873-78 (1995) 
(proposing to financially reward prosecutors for obtaining convictions on the same charge 
pursued at the outset of the case). 
78. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
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the defendant of the underlying murder charge. 79 If prosecutors 
do currently use this tactic, the requirement of posting and possi-
bly forfeiting a bond likely would put an end to it. 
In addition to encouraging prosecutors to choose their death 
penalty cases more carefully and more sparingly, the bond re-
quirement would also encourage prosecutors to try cases with 
greater caution and to give all close calls to the defendant, so as 
to avoid a reversal on appeal. Under the current system, prosecu-
tors who procure death sentences are rewarded with good public-
ity, promotions, and perhaps even with judicial office. 80 By con-
trast, those same prosecutors suffer little stigma when death 
sentences are reversed on appeal because many years have gone 
by (at which point the prosecutor may not even work in the office 
any longer) and the public's attention has moved on to new death 
penalty cases. 81 Moreover, when capital cases are reversed, prose-
cutors often are able to lay the blame on the judiciary rather than 
the prosecutor's office. Thus, prosecutors who push the envelope 
at trial to procure a death sentence are rarely called on the carpet 
to account for appellate reversals. 82 
Requiring counties to forfeit a cash bond following reversals 
likely would stigmatize the prosecutors who handled the case at 
trial. Following reversal of a death sentence, local newspapers 
and television stations almost certainly would run stories indicat-
ing that the reversal will cost the county a large cash bond plus 
numerous years of compounded interest. If the costly reversal 
were to lead to public criticism of the prosecutors who handled 
79. See Richard Salgado, Note, Tribunals Organized to Convict: Searching for a Lesser 
Evil in the Capital Juror Death Qualification Process in United States v. Green, 2005 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 519, 520-21; Rosenberg, supra note 10 (quoting prosecutor as saying that 
"[e]veryone who's ever prosecuted a murder case wants a death-qualified jury"). 
80. See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: De-
ciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 
759, 776 (1995) ("A common route to the bench is through a prosecutor's office, where try-
ing high-profile capital cases can result in publicity and name recognition for a prosecutor 
with judicial ambitions."). 
81. See Liebman, supra note 19, at 2119-29. 
82. See id. at 2127 ("[E]ven in the rare event that there is someone back home who 
can be, and who is, singled out for a reversal penalty five or ten years after the fact, the 
penalty comes nowhere near canceling out the amortized rewards from generating the 
mistaken death sentence in the first place."). To the contrary, prosecutors that cut corners 
and commit misconduct are sometimes rewarded. See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, 
Break Rules, Be Promoted, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1999, at 1 (explaining how prosecutors re-
buked by an appellate court were promoted to supervisory positions and later elected 
judges). 
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the case, 83 future capital prosecutors would have a strong incen-
tive not just to win their capital cases, but also to ensure that de-
fendants have the fairest possible trial and have the benefit of all 
close calls so that there will not be an appellate reversal. 
The prospect of forfeiting a large bond also would motivate 
county prosecutors to advocate improvement of the abysmal state 
of representation provided to indigent defendants. As Stephen 
Bright remarked over a decade ago, it is often the defendant with 
the worst lawyer, rather than the one who committed the worst 
crime, who receives the death penalty. 84 Yet, under the current 
system, all that most prosecutors do about the inadequacy of rep-
resentation is privately lament the problem. 85 County prosecutors 
have little incentive to push for better representation for defen-
dants because complaining about the lawyers a judge has ap-
pointed86 almost certainly would hurt a prosecutor's working re-
83. Unfortunately, at present, reversals often do not lead to shaming of the trial 
prosecutor because courts tend to omit prosecutors' names from their opinions, thus 
shielding them from embarrassment. See Armstrong & Possley, supra note 82 ("Appellate 
courts rarely name prosecutors or defense attorneys in their opinions, even when a lawyer 
is found to have acted abominably."). While this practice is unlikely to change, investiga-
tive reporters would have greater incentive to dig up the prosecutors' names when coun-
ties have posted a bond because the story could focus not only on the appellate reversal 
but also the large cash bond the county would forfeit . 
84. See Bright, supra note 51, at 1836. 
85. Consider the case of Calvin Burdine, whose capital conviction was reversed be-
cause his lawyer slept through trial. On remand, the trial judge refused to appoint Bur-
dine's very competent appellate lawyer to handle the retrial. The refusal outraged the lo-
cal newspaper and prompted a federal judge to order the state trial judge to explain her 
actions. Yet, the Attorney General's Office did not oppose the judge's actions, saying, 
"That's between the judge and Mr. Burdine's lawyers." Henry Weinstein, Attorney in 
'Sleeping Lawyer' Case Hits Roadblock in Texas, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 2002, at 28; Henry 
Weinstein, U.S., State Jurists Tangle in Next Phase of Sleeping· Lawyer Saga, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 29, 2002, at 30. For other examples, see Dirk Johnson, Shoddy Defense by Lawyers 
Puts Innocents on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2000, at A1 (explaining that Chicago 
Mayor Richard M. Daley supported a moratorium on executions because when he prose-
cuted death penalty cases as a Cook County state's attorney, "the defense lawyers in some 
of those cases were incompetent"); Laura LaFay, Virginia's Poor Receive Justice on the 
Cheap: Rock-Bottom Pay for Court-Appointed Lawyers Undermines System, Lawyer Says, 
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 15, 1998, at A1 (quoting prosecutor as saying that litigating 
against inexperienced and inadequate lawyers "doesn't give me any satisfaction as a 
prosecutor, and I don't think it serves justice"). 
86. On the manners in which unqualified attorneys are appointed by judges to handle 
capital cases, see Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, Report Regarding Implementation of 
the American Bar Association's Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning the Death 
Penalty and Calling for a Moratorium on Executions, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 
14 (1996); Paul Duggan, George W. Bush: The Record in Texas; Attorneys' Ineptitude 
Doesn't Halt Executions, WASH. POST, May 12, 2000, at Al. 
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lationship with that judge. 87 While the harm of sticking their 
necks out is great, the benefit of fighting for better representation 
for indigent defendants, at present, is minimal; appellate courts 
infrequently reverse capital convictions based on ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, 88 and even when such reversals occur, it is not 
the prosecutors who are held responsible. 
The prospect of forfeiting a bond could change the current state 
of affairs and lead prosecutors to advocate better indigent defense 
representation. If the reversal of any death sentence required the 
county to forfeit the large bond it posted, and if prosecutors were 
held politically responsible for the forfeiture, they would have an 
incentive to ensure that defendants are adequately represented 
at trial. Thus, prosecutors might not stand by quietly while local 
judges appoint unqualified cronies, and they might not sit idly 
while drunk or sleeping lawyers provide terrible representation to 
defendants during trial. 89 To the contrary, the elected District At-
torney (and her subordinates) might advocate for defendants to 
receive qualified, conscious, and sober counsel before trials begin. 
Accordingly, if an appointed lawyer's incompetence became ap-
parent during trial, prosecutors could move for a mistrial, rather 
than face the prospect of a successful ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim that would lead to forfeiture of the county's bond. 90 
Put simply, the prospect of a cash penalty that might result in the 
87. See Mary Flood, What Price Justice? Gary Graham Case Fueled Debate over Ap· 
pointed Attorneys, Hous. CHRON., July 1, 2000, at A1 ("Until five years ago, often the only 
requirement for an appointment to a capital murder case was a lawyer's close relation-
ship--either through friendship or campaign contributions-to the judge."). 
88. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text; see also Donald A. Dripps, Ineffec-
tive Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 242, 284 (1997) (noting the difficulty of making successful ineffective assis-
tance of counsel challenges). 
89. Consider the case of Joe Frank Cannon who repeatedly was appointed to handle 
capital cases in Harris County, Texas, even though he had ten separate clients sentenced 
to death and reportedly fell asleep during a number of their trials. See Paul M. Barrett, 
On the Defense: Lawyer's Fast Work on Death Cases Raises Doubts About System, WALL 
ST. J., Sept. 7, 1994, at A1; see also John Makeig, Asleep on the Job? Slaying Trial Boring, 
Lawyer Says, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 14, 1992, at A35 (retained lawyer in capital case con-
ceded he was sleeping because the trial was boring); Henry Weinstein, A Sleeping Lawyer 
and a Ticket to Death Row, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 2000, at A1 (discussing performance of 
capital defense attorney in case where "prosecutors acknowledge that sleeping occurred 
but say that should not bar the execution."). If Harris County had faced the possibility of 
forfeiting a substantial bond for reversal of a death sentence, prosecutors likely would 
have opposed the appointment of poor quality lawyers to numerous capital cases. 
90. A prosecutor's mistrial motion premised on the grounds that the defendant is be-
ing treated unfairly would certainly amount to manifest necessity, and double jeopardy 
would not bar reprosecution. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 610-12 (1976). 
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elected District Attorney being held politically accountable if the 
death sentence were reversed could lead prosecutors to be more 
proactive in seeking quality representation for indigent defen-
dants. 91 
In adopting the ali-or-nothing approach, the most difficult issue 
for state legislatures to resolve would be the amount of the bond. 
As noted, it would make sense for state legislatures to set the 
bond at the average amount the state spends to protect a death 
sentence on appeal. Some states may have this figure readily 
available, but even those without the information could procure it 
by retaining a statistician or economist to analyze the costs. Once 
an appropriate amount for the bond is determined, legislatures 
could draft a statute along the lines set forth here: 
a. Preamble 
1. Whereas the death penalty is a fitting and appropriate 
punishment for perpetrators of heinous crimes, and 
2. Whereas local prosecutors should retain discretion to de-
termine which cases merit capital prosecutions, and 
3. Whereas the costs of imposing the death penalty are sub-
stantial, and 
4. Whereas the state shoulders all of the appellate costs to 
ensure that death sentences are in fact carried out, the fol-
lowing procedures shall be required to ensure the death 
penalty will be applied in a fair, non-arbitrary manner that 
will be upheld on appeal. 
b. Requirement to Post a Bond: In any case in which county 
prosecutors determine that the death penalty is merited, the 
county must remit a bond of X dollars to the state treasury be-
fore filing capital charges. The bond will be held in an individ-
ual interest-bearing account and will accrue interest at the 
prime rate as published by the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System. 
91. On this point, consider recent events from Harris County, Texas, where long-time 
District Attorney Chuck Rosenthal stepped back into the courtroom to personally prose-
cute a high-profile capital murder of a police officer. Perhaps because Rosenthal was per-
sonally involved and his reputation on the line, the prosecution took the unusual step of 
pressing for the defendant to receive the best possible appointed lawyer. See Deborah 
Wrigley, Judge Clears Courtroom to Have One-On-One Talk With Accused Cop Killer, 
KTRK NEWS, Nov. 28, 2006, http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=local&id=4804 766. 
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c. Recovery of Bond Following Execution: If a death sentence 
is imposed following trial, and if that death sentence is not 
reversed or overturned on appeal or in a habeas corpus pe-
tition, the full bond amount, plus interest, shall be returned 
to the county within 30 days following the execution. 
d. Consequences of Failed Prosecution: 
1. Failed Prosecution or Appeal: Except as provided in 
sections d(2) and d(3), if the capital prosecution does not 
result in an execution, the full bond plus all accrued inter-
est will be forfeited to the state. 
2. Commutation: In the event that the death sentence is 
commuted by the Governor for reasons other than prose-
cutorial misconduct, the full bond amount shall be re-
turned to the county, plus interest, within 30 days follow-
ing the commutation. 
A. For purposes of section d(2), prosecutorial miscon-
duct shall be deemed not to have occurred unless the 
Governor specifically provides in writing that prosecu-
torial misconduct was a motivating factor for the com-
mutation. 
B. In the event there is any dispute between the state 
and the county about whether the commutation was 
due to prosecutorial misconduct, the dispute shall be 
resolved by the Attorney General of the State within 
30 days following the commutation. 
3. Death: In the event that the death-sentenced individual 
dies prior to the exhaustion of his appeals, the full bond 
amount, plus interest, shall be returned to the county 
within 30 days following the prisoner's death. 
B. The Graduated Approach 
The second proposal is what could be called a "graduated" bond 
forfeiture. As with the ali-or-nothing approach, counties would be 
required to post a bond before seeking the death penalty. If the 
county prosecutors succeeded in procuring a death sentence and 
preserving the sentence through the appellate process, then the 
state would return the bond amount, plus interest, to the county 
following the execution. If the county failed to win a death sen-
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tence or if the sentence were reversed on appeal, then the county 
would forfeit part of the bond. The amount of the forfeiture would 
depend on the stage of the process where the death sentence was 
lost. 
For example, if the county sought the death penalty and the 
jury refused to return a death sentence, the state might provide 
for the return of 75% of the bond amount, plus the interest ac-
crued on that amount. Returning such a substantial amount of 
the bond would reflect the fact that the case ended quickly and 
the state was not forced to expend any money to defend a death 
sentence on appeal. Such a large refund would signal to prosecu-
tors that they need not abandon the death penalty in all difficult 
cases because, even if they are unsuccessful some of the time, the 
county would not lose an overwhelming amount of money. Never-
theless, the risk of losing 25% of the bond amount should deter 
prosecutors from seeking the death penalty in non-meritorious 
cases. 
Under a graduated approach, the percentage of the bond re-
funded to the county would diminish as the capital case pro-
gressed through the appellate process. Therefore, if a jury handed 
down a death sentence, and the state were forced to defend that 
sentence on appeal, the County would forfeit 50% of the bond if 
the death sentence were reversed during the direct appeal proc-
ess. If the death sentence were reversed during the collateral 
postconviction review process (which follows direct appeals), the 
county would forfeit 75% of the bond amount. Finally, if any court 
overturned the death sentence due to prosecutorial misconduct, 
the county would forfeit 100% of the bond amount, regardless of 
when in the process the reversal occurred. 92 
As with the ali-or-nothing approach, a few exceptions would be 
warranted for the graduated approach. Once again, the county 
would be entitled to a full refund of the bond, plus interest, if the 
prisoner's death sentence were commuted for reasons other than 
prosecutorial misconduct, or if the prisoner died prior to the ex-
haustion of his appeals. Additionally, the legislature might want 
to add an exception allowing the county to fully recover the bond, 
plus interest, if the death sentence were reversed due to a water-
92. Sadly, prosecutorial misconduct, primarily in the form of suppressing exculpatory 
evidence, accounts for almost 20% of reversals at the state and federal postconviction 
stage. See LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 41. 
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shed change in substantive criminal doctrine. 93 In this respect, if 
the prosecutor made an error at trial that was simply unforesee-
able, then she should not be blamed and the full bond amount 
should be refunded to the county. 
Like the aU-or-nothing approach, the graduated forfeiture 
would provide counties with an incentive to pursue only the 
strongest capital cases. If a case looks like a long-shot, the gradu-
ated approach would encourage prosecutors not to seek the death 
penalty at the outset, or at least to plea bargain before trial be-
gins. 
The graduated approach also would encourage prosecutors to 
consider bargaining with the defendant during the appellate or 
habeas corpus process-a practice that is largely unheard of to-
day. 94 For instance, if the county prevails in the first series of ap-
peals but comes to see its position as weak and fears that the 
death sentence will not be preserved all the way through the 
lengthy appellate process, the county might reach a compromise 
with the defendant whereby a life sentence is imposed. Thus, the 
state is spared the unnecessary expense of further appeals and 
the county is allowed to recover a portion of its bond amount. 
Finally, a graduated bond forfeiture approach might encourage 
the revival of the now rare use of executive clemency. Under the 
current system, governors and pardon boards are reluctant to 
take responsibility for granting clemency because it is politically 
unpopular to stop an execution. 95 And if governors do commute a 
death sentence, they typically do so after millions of dollars have 
been expended on the lengthy appeals process. 96 Under the 
93. This would be a twist on the Supreme Court's retroactivity doctrine under Teague 
u. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which ordinarily forbids petitioners from benefiting from new 
rules of procedure, but makes an exception for "watershed rules of criminal procedure." I d. 
at 311. Of course, just as it is nearly impossible for a habeas petitioner to prevail under 
the Teague doctrine, it likewise would be very difficult for a county to prevail either. On 
the significance and impossibility of surmounting the Teague doctrine, see Stephen F. 
Smith, Activism As Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1057, 
1074-77 (2002). 
94. See Anup Malani, Habeas Settlements, 92 VA. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (2006) (advocating 
that prosecutors and defendants settle cases that are pending on habeas corpus petitions). 
95. See Adam M. Gershowitz, The Diffusion of Responsibility in Capital Clemency, 17 
J.L. & POL. 669, 671-72 (2001). 
96. Capital prisoners rarely receive clemency before their appeals have been ex-
hausted (or nearly exhausted), although it does happen occasionally when governors make 
blanket commutations at the end of their terms. See Daniel T. Kobil, Do the Paperwork or 
Die: Clemency, Ohio Style?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 655, 656-59 (1991) (discussing clemencies 
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graduated bond forfeiture approach (as well as the all-or-nothing 
approach), county governments would have an incentive in 
weaker cases to lobby the governor to commute death sentences 
that could possibly be reversed on appeal. In other words, because 
counties would receive a refund of the entire bond amount, plus 
interest, if the governor commutes a death sentence, they would 
have a financial incentive to lobby for commutations if they 
feared that the death sentence might be reversed on appeal. If 
counties successfully lobbied to commute death sentences that 
had a fair chance of being reversed on appeal, the result would be 
a system where less time and money is devoted to capital appeals 
because the commutation would eliminate the need for further 
litigation. 
Taking all of these considerations into account, a state legisla-
ture interested in the graduated approach could enact legislation 
modeled on the following draft statute: 
a. Preamble 
1. Whereas the death penalty is a fitting and appropriate 
punishment for perpetrators of heinous crimes, and 
2. Whereas local prosecutors should retain discretion to de-
termine which cases merit capital prosecutions, and 
3. Whereas the costs of imposing the death penalty are sub-
stantial, and 
4. Whereas the state shoulders all of the appellate costs to 
ensure that death sentences are in fact carried out, the fol-
lowing procedures shall be required to ensure the death 
penalty will be applied in a fair, non-arbitrary manner that 
will be upheld on appeal. 
b. Requirement to Post a Bond: In any case in which county 
prosecutors determine that the death penalty is merited, the 
county must remit a bond of X dollars to the State treasury be-
fore filing capital charges. The bond will be held in an individ-
ual interest-bearing account and will accrue interest at the 
prime rate as published by the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System. 
awarded by Ohio Governor Richard Celeste at the end of his second term); SARAT, supra 
note 71, at 1-32 (discussing Governor George Ryan's commutations in Illinois). 
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c. Recovery of Bond Following Execution: If a death sentence 
is imposed following trial, and if that death sentence is notre-
versed or overturned on appeal or in a habeas corpus petition, 
the full bond amount, plus interest, shall be returned to the 
county within 30 days following the execution. 
d. Consequences of Failed Prosecution: In the event that a 
capital prosecution does not result in execution, the bond 
posted by the county shall be returned to the county in the pro-
portions set forth as follows: 
1. Prior to Jury Selection: In the event that a county has 
already posted a bond but states in writing, prior to the 
beginning of jury selection, that it no longer intends to 
seek the death penalty, the full bond amount, plus inter-
est, shall be returned to the county within 30 days of the 
county's written notification. 
2. Mistrial: In the event that the trial ends in a mistrial 
for reasons other than prosecutorial misconduct as speci-
fied in section d(6)(A), the full bond amount, plus interest, 
shall be returned to the county within 30 days of the mis-
trial. 
3. Acquittal or Life Sentence: In the event that the trial 
ends in an acquittal or the imposition of a sentence other 
than death, 75% of the bond amount, plus interest on that 
portion only, shall be returned to the county within 30 
days of the verdict. 
4. Reversed on Direct Appeal: Except as provided in sec-
tion d(6), if a death sentence is imposed following trial but 
the death sentence is reversed during the direct appeal 
process to the state's intermediate court of appeals, the 
state supreme court or the Supreme Court of the United 
States, 50% of the bond amount, plus interest on that por-
tion only, shall be returned to the county within 30 days of 
the termination of the direct appeal process. 
5. Reversed on Collateral Appeal: Except as provided in 
section d(6), if a death sentence is imposed following trial, 
but the death sentence is reversed during the collateral 
appeals process, which shall include state and federal ha-
beas corpus actions, 25% of the bond amount, plus interest 
on that portion only, shall be returned to the county 
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within 30 days of the termination of the collateral appeal 
process. 
6. Prosecutorial Misconduct: In the event of a mistrial or 
the reversal of a death sentence due to a specific finding of 
prosecutorial misconduct as specified in section d(6)(A), 
the county shall forfeit the full bond amount, plus all ac-
crued interest. 
A Prosecutorial misconduct shall include the failure to 
turn over exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the unlawful exercise of 
peremptory challenges based on race or gender, sub-
orning perjury, knowingly using false testimony, coerc-
ing witnesses, or fabricating evidence. 
B. In the event there is any dispute between the 
county and the state as to whether the reversal of a 
death sentence was due to prosecutorial misconduct, 
the dispute shall be resolved by the Attorney General 
of the State within 30 days following the termination of 
the appeals process. 
7. Commutation: In the event that the death sentence is 
commuted by the Governor for reasons other than prose-
cutorial misconduct as specified in section d(7)(A), the full 
bond amount shall be returned to the county, with inter-
est, within 30 days following the commutation. 
A For purposes of section d(7) only, prosecutorial mis-
conduct shall be presumed not to have occurred unless 
the Governor specifically states in writing that prose-
cutorial misconduct was a motivating factor for the 
commutation. 
B. In the event there is any ambiguity about whether 
the commutation was due to prosecutorial misconduct, 
the dispute shall be resolved by the Attorney General 
of the State within 30 days following the commutation. 
8. Death: In the event that the death-sentenced individual 
dies prior to the exhaustion of his appeals, the full bond 
amount, plus interest, shall be returned to the county 
within 30 days following the prisoner's death. 
HeinOnline  -- 41 U. Rich. L. Rev. 887 2006-2007
2007] PAY NOW, EXECUTE LATER 887 
C. Solving the Small County Problem 
The purpose of forcing county prosecutors to post a bond prior 
to seeking the death penalty is to change the behavior of medium-
and large-sized counties that overproduce death sentences. The 
goal is to make them face the full financial consequences of their 
decisions and to deter them from seeking the death penalty in 
marginal cases. The proposal is not intended to deter the use of 
capital punishment in appropriate cases. Yet, critics could argue 
that the proposal would place an impossible financial burden on 
small counties, thus making the death penalty so expensive that 
only wealthy counties could utilize it. 97 While I share this con-
cern, I offer two reasons why it is not particularly worrisome. 
First, it is already rare for small counties to seek the death 
penalty because they are unwilling to shoulder the tremendous 
pretrial and trial costs of capital cases. 98 And when truly egre-
gious cases do come along, small counties are sometimes willing 
to seek the death penalty, even knowing full well that it will 
cause serious financial problems for the county. 99 For example, 
consider the vicious murder of James Byrd, who was dragged to 
his death in Jasper County, Texas. 100 Although prosecutors knew 
97. See Steve Brewer, A Deadly Distinction; County has Budget to Prosecute with a 
Vengeance; District Attorney's Office Focuses on Capital Cases, and Commissioners Court 
Backs up the Approach, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 4, 2001, at A28 ("'One of the reasons Harris 
County tries so many capital murder cases is simple economics-we can afford to,' said 
state District Judge Michael McSpadden."). 
98. See, e.g., WASH. STATE BAR AsS'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE DEATH PENALTY 
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC DEFENSE 33 (2006), available at, http:// 
www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/finalreport.pdf ("Several smaller [Washington] counties 
face difficult financial circumstances and prosecutors in those counties may be concemed 
by the significant impacts the costs of a death penalty case would have on the county's fi-
nancial condition."); Robert Bryce, Trial's High Costs Tax Jasper Coffers, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Feb. 25, 1999, at 2 ("[l]n recent years, several [small] Texas counties have not 
pursued the death penalty because of the high costs involved."); Tolson, supra note 7 
(showing that between 1976 and 2000, 138 of Texas's 254 counties never sought the death 
penalty and that another 53 counties sought death only once during that period). 
99. Dartmouth economist Katherine Baicker has determined that counties that seek 
the death penalty have a higher tax rate than counties that do not utilize the death pen-
alty. See Katherine Baicker, The Budgetary Repercussions of Capital Convictions 15 (Nat'l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8382, 2001), available at, http://www. 
nber.org/papers/w8382. 
100. For accounts of the Byrd case, see JOYCE KING, HATE CRIME: THE STORY OF A 
DRAGGING IN JASPER, TEXAS (2002); DINA TEMPLE-RASTON, A DEATH IN TEXAS: A STORY OF 
RACE, MURDER AND A SMALL TOWN'S STRUGGLE FOR REDEMPTION (2003). In the twenty-
five years before the Byrd case, Jasper County sent only one defendant to death row. See 
Tolson & Brewer, supra note 9. 
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that seeking the death penalty would be a financial crunch for the 
small county of about 35,000 people, 101 they charged three defen-
dants with capital murder and spent more than $1 million seek-
ing the death penalty. 102 Indeed, the county actually raised prop-
erty taxes to pay for the trial. 103 If prosecutors felt so strongly 
that the death penalty outweighed the huge financial costs, it is 
unlikely that they would have been deterred by the additional 
costs of posting a bond. 104 
Second, when a truly heinous case arises, counties that are fi-
nancially unable to post a bond to seek the death penalty could 
apply to the state government for supplemental funding. On occa-
sion, state governments provide counties with discretionary funds 
to assist with the unusually high costs of certain criminal 
cases. 105 Consider the example of another small Texas jurisdic-
tion, Polk County, which has a population of 46,000. 106 Polk 
County has been trying for decades to execute John Paul Penry 
for a brutal rape and murder. 107 Due to Supreme Court rulings, 
Penry has been granted two retrials, which have cost Polk County 
exorbitant sums of money. To help defray the costs of the third 
trial, the State of Texas provided Polk County with $100,000. 108 
101. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKF'ACTS, http://quickfacts.cen 
sus.gov/qfd/states/48/48241.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2007). 
102. See Gold, supra note 16. 
103. See id. (explaining that the Byrd case forced "a 6.7% increase in [local] property 
taxes over two years to pay for the trial"). 
104. See Richard Stewart, Three Indicted by Grand Jury in Jasper Case; Charges of 
Capital Murder Face Whites in Black's Dragging Death, Hous. CHRON., July 7, 1998, at A1 
(quoting Jasper County District Attorney as saying that the trial costs could be $1 million 
and that "'Obviously, there will have to be an increase in taxes .... We'll do what we have 
to do.'"). There are similar situations in other small counties. See, e.g., Barbara A. Serrano, 
A Cop-Killing Trial-At All Costs-Million-Dollar Prosecution Could Bring Okanogan 
County to its Knees Financially, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 31, 1999, at A1 (explaining that 
Okanogan County, Washington sought the death penalty for a cop-killer even though the 
costs required a freeze on hiring, raises, and procurement, because, according to the chair-
man of the County Board of Commissioners,"[w)e have to put every bit we can into this 
trial."). 
105. Serrano, supra note 104 (stating that as of 1999, "[t)wenty-nine states have cre-
ated special accounts or teams of public defenders to assist counties in trying capital cases 
against indigents"). 
106. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKF'ACTS, http://quickfacts.cen 
sus.gov/qfd/states/48/48373.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2007). 
107. For background on the crime, see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 307-13 (1989). 
108. See Gold, supra note 16; cf WASH. STATE BAR AsS'N, supra note 98, at 33 (describ-
ing the Extraordinary Criminal Justice Costs Act of 1999, which allows Washington coun-
ties to apply for reimbursement of certain costs in first-degree murder cases). 
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If states are occasionally willing to assist small counties with 
the hefty trial costs of capital cases, they also likely would help 
small counties to post bonds in unusually egregious cases. Of 
course, this scenario carries the risk of the exception swallowing 
the rule. The purpose of requiring counties to post (and possibly 
forfeit) a cash bond to seek the death penalty is to force them to 
internalize the steep financial costs of unsuccessful death penalty 
appeals. If counties are regularly permitted to use state money to 
post the bonds, then they will not internalize those costs and will 
be unlikely to change their behavior. 
While this scenario is problematic, it would be unlikely to occur 
very often. States have only a relatively small amount of discre-
tionary money to assist counties with capital cases. 109 And while 
state legislatures might be convinced to assist a small (or even a 
large) county with the costs of posting a bond in a James Byrd-
type case, legislatures likely would be unwilling to provide ex 
ante funding for multiple such cases in a given year. 
Ill. INCENTIVES FOR STATE LEGISLATURES 
The final significant question to address is whether state legis-
latures would have any interest in requiring counties to post and 
risk forfeiting a bond to seek the death penalty. There are two 
reasons why the answer might be yes. First, the available data 
indicates that states spend large sums of money to defend coun-
ties' death penalty verdicts on appeal. In recent years, there are 
increasing examples of states bucking the "tough on crime" trend 
to reduce corrections spending in favor of funding other budget 
priorities. Second, legislators from smaller counties that rarely 
use the death penalty have an added incentive to require a bond 
in capital cases because they are currently spending their tax dol-
lars to subsidize the capital appeals of larger counties. 
109. See, e.g ., WASH. STATE BAR Ass'N, supra note 98, at 33 (explaining that Washing-
ton State's Extraordinary Criminal Justice Costs Act of 1999, which provides state fund-
ing to counties, "has not been fully funded and its funding has steadily declined"). 
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A. Appeals Are the Most Expensive Aspect of Capital Cases 
A number of studies have found capital punishment to be a 
more expensive process than life imprisonment. For instance, a 
North Carolina study estimated the costs of an execution to be 
$2.16 million more than the cost of imprisoning an individual for 
life. 110 A Texas study conducted in the early 1990s estimated that 
the death penalty cost $2.3 million per case prosecuted in the 
state, about three times the cost of imprisoning someone for forty 
years. m Commentators have estimated that large states such as 
California and Florida could save tens of millions of dollars per 
year by eliminating capital punishment. 112 
Significantly, the bulk of the costs associated with capital cases 
are not the trials themselves, but the appeals. 113 Because of com-
plicated rules and multiple stages of review in capital cases, ap-
pellate costs are far greater than costs in non-capital cases. 114 For 
instance, a 2003 study of Kansas found that the appellate costs 
associated with death penalty cases were more than twenty times 
the costs in non-capital cases. 115 A North Carolina study found 
the appellate and postconviction costs in capital cases to be about 
110. See PHILIP J . COOK ET AL., THE COSTS OF PROCESSING MURDER CASES IN NORTH 
CAROLINA 78 (1993), available at http://www-pps.aas.duke.edu/people/faculty/cook/comnc. 
pdf. 
111. See Christy Hoppe, Executions Cost Texas Millions: Study Finds It's Cheaper to 
Jail Killers for Life, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 8, 1992, at lA. 
112. See e.g., S.V. Date, The High Price of Killing Killers: Death Penalty Prosecutions 
Cost Taxpayers Millions Annually, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 4, 2000, at lA (explaining that 
Florida spends $51 million per year to enforce the death penalty); Rone Tempest, Death 
Row Often Means a Long Life: California Condemns Many Murderers, but Few Are Ever 
Executed, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at 1 ("[M)aintaining the California death penalty sys-
tem costs taxpayers more than $114 million a year beyond the cost of simply keeping the 
convicts locked up for life and not counting the millions more in court costs needed to 
prosecute capital cases and hold post-conviction hearings in state and federal courts."). 
113. See Bohm, supra note 16, at 582 ("The posttrial stage generally is the most expen-
sive part of the entire process."); Liebman, supra note 19, at 2139 (describing as "silly" 
that we "pay a few thousands dollars per capital trial, then millions of dollars per post-
trial review"); Death Penalty Cases Costly, Legislators Told, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 30, 
1995, at B3 (reporting Pennsylvania Attorney General's assertion that "the cost of defend-
ing death penalty appeals [in the state) could reach $1 million per case"). 
114. See COOK ET AL., supra note 110, at 64 ("[W]e estimate that death cases are 45 
percent more costly on direct appeal than life cases, on average."). 
115. See LEGISLATIVE POST AUDIT COMM., LEGISLATURE OF KAN., COSTS INCURRED FOR 
DEATH PENALTY CASES: A K-GOAL AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS ii (2003) 
[hereinafter KAN. DEATH PENALTY COSTS), available at http://www.klegislature.org/post 
auditlaudits_perform/04pa03a.pdf ("At just over $400,000, the projected appeal-related 
costs for the death penalty cases in our sample was more than 20 times the projected cost 
for cases in which the death penalty wasn't sought."). 
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four times as great as trial costs. 116 A capital defense lawyer in 
California explained over a decade ago that each death penalty 
case costs between $3.5 and $4.5 million in postconviction costs, 
far in excess of the $1 to $1.2 million in trial costs.117 
More interesting than the sheer size of appellate and postcon-
viction costs is who pays for them. Typically, it is states that 
spend millions of dollars to defend counties' death penalty ver-
dicts following trial. 118 In most instances, it is the state attorney 
general's office, rather than county prosecutors, which handle ap-
peals and habeas corpus petitions in capital cases. 119 In addition, 
many states provide lawyers for indigent defendants on appeal 
and state postconviction review, something that is not provided in 
non-capital cases. 120 In addition to attorney time, the state typi-
cally pays for court costs associated with death penalty cases. 121 A 
recent study of fourteen Kansas death-penalty cases found that 
the state paid more than $3 million in appellate related costs, 
compared with less than $100,000 paid by the counties. 122 
State legislators may soon grow weary of paying high appellate 
costs for death penalty verdicts that often are reversed on appeal. 
And legislators also might wish to shift those costs to county 
budgets. Consider the slowly emerging trend in non-capital ex-
penditures. During the 1990s, state spending on corrections dou-
bled from $17 billion to $35 billion.123 But as prison costs have 
116. See COOKET AL., supra note 110, at 77. 
117. See Charles L. Linder, Opinion, Cost of Death: A Billion Dollars and Counting, 
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1993, at Ml. 
118. See, e.g., CONN. COMM'N ON THE DEATH PENALTY, STUDY PuRSUANT TO PuBLIC ACT 
No. 01-151 OF THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CONNECTICUT 67 (2003) (ex-
plaining that the Office of the Chief State's Attorney "has requested state funding to add 
six prosecutors and support staff to prosecute habeas corpus proceedings in death penalty 
cases"), available at http://www.opm.state.ct.us/pdpdl/CDP/DCP _Final_Report-Jan2003. 
doc. 
119. See supra note 18. 
120. For example, Tennessee's Office of the Post-Conviction Defender has a staff of 
thirteen and a budget of more than $1 million per year. See WILSON ET AL., supra note 75, 
at 25-26. 
121. In New Jersey, for instance, "two additional clerks have been needed almost full 
time to assist the [state supreme court] justices with research on the capital cases." MARY 
E. FORSBERG, N.J . POLICY PERSPECTIVE, MONEY FOR NOTHING?: THE FINANCIAL COST OF 
NEW JERSEY'S DEATH PENALTY 10 (2005), available at http://www.njpp.org/rpt_moneyfor 
nothing.html. 
122. See KAN. DEATH PENALTY COSTS, supra note 115, at 12. The Kansas study found 
that the state had paid 85% of the total death penalty costs, compared with only 15% paid 
by the counties. See id. 
123. See ROBIN CAMPBELL, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, DOLLARS AND SENTENCES: 
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skyrocketed, some legislators have begun to express concerns 
about having enough funding for other public needs, such as 
health care, education, and law enforcement. 124 Although it is still 
popular to be "tough on crime," some states recently have taken 
steps toward reducing their corrections costs. 125 In 2003, five 
states reduced sentences for nonviolent offenders, and a handful 
of other states created substance abuse treatment programs as an 
alternative to incarceration. 126 Recent reports by the Vera Insti-
tute of Justice have documented that twenty-five states reduced 
their corrections budgets in 2002, 127 while "at least nine states 
decreased their actual corrections expenditures in fiscal year 
2003, and at least 14 [states] cut their initial corrections appro-
priations in fiscal year 2004."128 Whereas a decade ago it might 
LEGISLATORS' VIEWS ON PRISONS, PUNISHMENT, AND THE BUDGET CRISIS 3 (2003). 
124. See, e.g., Ann Imse, Prison Trend Costly; Inmates Enter State's Cellblocks at Rate 
Well Above Average, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), June 19, 2006, at 4A (discussing a 
Colorado legislator's complaint that the need to come up with an extra 7,000 prison beds 
would cost a half-billion dollars and would "eat up our entire budget" and stating that 
"[t]he bill for prisons plays a major role in tight funding for other needs such as education 
and health care"); Bill Murphy, Not All Agree New Jails Needed; Lawmaker Says County 
Should Let Some Offenders Out on Bail to Free Up Existing Cells, Hous. CHRON. Dec. 11, 
2006, at A1 (quoting state legislator advocating shorter sentences or granting bail more 
often to avoid spending $267 million to build new jails); Joseph Turner, Huge Prison Bill 
on its Way, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Oct. 8, 2006, at A1 ("Lawmakers tried for several 
years to avoid building a full-fledged prison in Eastern Washington because of its cost-
$231 million."); cf MICHAEL JACOBSON, DOWNSIZING PRISONS: HOW TO REDUCE CRIME AND 
END MAss INCARCERATION 12 (2005) ("Even with a slowly recovering national economy, 
states simply do not (and will not) have the revenue to continue prison expansion while 
simultaneously supporting Medicaid, maintaining low tax rates, and adequately funding 
education and health systems."); Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sen-
tencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1309 (2005) ("If the citizens in one state would rather 
spend a greater proportion of their limited budget on education than the construction of 
new prisons, they could adjust state sentencing policy accordingly."). 
125. See JACOBSON, supra note 124, at 85 (discussing how twenty-five states reduced 
their corrections budgets in 2002 because of budget shortfalls); RYAN S. KING & MARC 
MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STATE SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS IN AN ERA OF 
FISCAL RESTRAINT 11-16 (2002), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/ 
Documents/publications/inc_statesentencingpolicy.pdf; Rachel E. Barkow, Administering 
Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 807 (2005). 
126. See JON WOOL & DON STEMEN, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CHANGING FORTUNES 
OR CHANGING ATTITUDES?: SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS REFORMS IN 2003 6-7 (2004), 
available at http://www. vera.org/publication_pdf/226_ 43l.pdf. 
127. DANIEL F. WILHELM & NICHOLAS R. TURNER, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, IS THE 
BUDGET CRISIS CHANGING THE WAY WE LOOK AT SENTENCING AND INCARCERATION? 2 
(2002), available at http://www.vera.org/publication_pdf/167_263.pdf. 
128. WOOL & STEMEN, supra note 126, at 2. 
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have been impossible to cut corrections budgets, today it is fre-
quently considered. 129 As Professor Rachel Barkow has explained: 
Examples abound of legislators emphasizing fiscal concerns in their 
newfound support for reduced sentencing. A Michigan legislator 
noted that when he first introduced bills to reduce mandatory mini-
mum sentences, he received little support. After a conference on the 
state budget, however, the governor called him "to see how we can 
make these bills happen." Kansas's decision to require treatment in-
stead of incarceration for first-time, nonviolent drug offenders rested 
in part on the fact that "those people who favor being tough on crime 
don't want to find the money to build more prisons." Washington 
passed its drug treatment diversion programs, according to one ex-
pert, because "[t]he fiscal crisis has brought together the folks who 
think sentences are too long with the folks who are perfectly happy 
with the sentences but think prison is costing too much." One Texas 
state representative supported treatment options for drug offenders 
because it was cost effective and would free prison space for more 
violent offenders. Several governors have ordered the early release of 
prisoners with the explicit goal of reducing correctional costs and 
addressing budget crises. 130 
Although most of the movement to restore fiscal discipline has 
focused on reducing incarceration costs, the same logic should ap-
ply with even greater force to the use of the death penalty, par-
ticularly since there has been a small decline in the popularity of 
the death penalty131 and a substantial decline in the number of 
death sentences in recent years. 132 Because capital cases are so 
expensive, and because so few of them actually end in executions, 
the system is ripe for reforms that impose greater fiscal disci-
pline. 133 Money saved on exorbitant capital appeals is money the 
states could spend on other projects. 134 
129. See CAMPBELL, supra note 123, at 4 (citing a Texas legislator's explanation in 
early 2003 that a budget deficit required the state to find $172 million in corrections sav-
ings); Chris Suellentrop, The Right Has a Jailhouse Conversion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 
2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 47 (discussing support for the Second Chance Act, which proposed 
nearly $100 million in spending to assist states in returning prisoners to society). 
130. Barkow, supra note 124, at 1287-88. 
131. See Robert M. Bohm, American Death Penalty Opinion: Past, Present, and Future, 
in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 27 (James R. Acker eta!. eds., 2d 
ed. 2003) (explaining that death penalty support, while still strong at 70%, is down from 
the 80% that favored the punishment in the mid-1990s). 
132. See Neil A. Lewis, Death Sentences Decline, and Experts Offer Reasons, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2006, at A28. 
133. Consider the California experience, where many prisoners sit on death row but 
only a handful have been executed. Experts estimate that California could save tens of 
millions of dollars each year by choosing its death penalty cases more sparingly. See Tern-
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B. Why Small Counties Have an Added Incentive to Back the 
Bond Proposal 
As explained above, the most expensive part of the death-
penalty system-appellate and postconviction costs-is typically 
funded at the state level. Thus, as Professor James Liebman has 
cogently explained, "nearly the entire cost of the review process 
and its outcome is borne, not by the trial-level actors who com-
mitted the errors in the first place, but by taxpayers spread 
throughout the entire state (who fund the state court system and 
state attorney general's office)."135 Financially, it is not a good 
deal for small counties that rarely seek the death penalty to sub-
sidize the significant appellate costs of larger counties that make 
frequent use of capital punishment. Thus, counties that use the 
death penalty infrequently have an added incentive to support a 
proposal that requires active death penalty counties-which typi-
cally have greater resources-to post a bond and to pay for their 
own mistakes in unsuccessful capital cases. 
Take Texas, the nation's leader in executions, as an example. 
In all likelihood, many of the legislators representing Harris 
County, which has sent nearly 300 individuals to death row over 
the last three decades, 136 would oppose any statute that required 
counties to post (and possibly forfeit) a bond to seek the death 
penalty. Presumably legislators in Bexar, Dallas, and Tarrant 
counties, which are collectively responsible for nearly 200 addi-
tional Texas death sentences, 137 also would oppose the bond stat-
ute. But what about the 138 Texas counties that did not hand 
down any death sentences between 1976 and 2000?138 Or what 
about the fifty-three counties that imposed only a single death 
pest, supra note 112. 
134. See Costs of the Death Penalty and Related Issues: Hearing Before the N.Y. State 
Assemb. Standing Comm. on Codes, Judiciary, and Correction 3 (2005) (statement of Rich· 
ard C. Dieter), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/NY-RCD-Test.pdf (explaining 
that tight budgets are leading to early release of prisoners and library closings to save 
costs); Fox Butterfield, As Cities Struggle, Police Get By With Less, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 
2004, at A10 (stating that cities have had to reduce their police forces because of reduc-
tions in state and federal aid). 
135. LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 380. 
136. See Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Total Number of Offenders Sentenced 
to Death From Each County [hereinafter TDCJ], http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/county 
sentenced.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2007). 
137. See id. 
138. See Tolson, supra note 7. 
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sentence during that same period?139 What fiscal incentive do 
those nearly 200 counties have to pay for the appellate costs cre-
ated by a handful of larger (and wealthier) counties that fre-
quently use the death penalty? 
Indeed, a head count of Texas counties finds that only seven of 
Texas's 254 counties sent more than twenty defendants to death 
row over the last thirty years. 140 The remaining 24 7 counties pro-
cured death sentences, on average, well less than once per year. 
To be sure, the seven Texas counties 141 that frequently use the 
death penalty are large jurisdictions and hold a substantial num-
ber of seats in the state legislature. But even if we were to count 
every Texas legislator who represents any portion of those seven 
counties, they would still account for only sixty-seven of the 150 
seats in the Texas House of Representatives. 142 Moreover, many 
of those sixty-seven legislative districts are in predominantly mi-
nority sections of large cities-constituencies that tend to oppose 
the use of the death penalty. 143 
While the political calculus is surely more complicated than 
simply conducting a head-count, the reality is that well over half 
the legislative districts in Texas have a fiscal incentive to require 
counties to post a bond and pay for the costs of failed capital 
prosecutions. The same logic likely applies in many other states 
where only a handful of counties actively use the death penalty. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
At present, county prosecutors are free to seek the death pen-
alty as they see fit, but they typically do not have to fund the very 
expensive appellate and postconviction stages of capital cases. 
Accordingly, when death sentences are reversed-and many of 
them are reversed for prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assis-
139. See id. 
140. See TDCJ, supra note 136. 
141. The seven Texas counties that have sent more than twenty individuals to death 
row during the last three decades are, as of November 2006, Bexar (73), Dallas (4 7), Har-
ris (282), Jefferson (23), Nueces (22), Smith (21), and Tarrant (64). See id. 
142. See Texas House of Representatives, House Membership, Listed By Name, 
http://www.house.state.tx.us/members/welcome.php (last visited Apr. 10, 2007). 
143. Support for the death penalty is consistently 20 points lower among minorities 
than Caucasians. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS- 2003, at 144 tbl.2.50 (2005). 
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tance of counsel, and other reasons-county prosecutors are not 
forced to fully internalize the costs of their failed prosecutions. 
State legislatures can provide a better incentive structure for lo-
cal prosecutors by requiring counties to post a bond before seek-
ing the death penalty. Faced with the prospect of losing the bond 
if the defendant is not sentenced to death or if the death sentence 
is reversed on appeal, prosecutors would have an incentive to 
choose their capital cases carefully and to avoid any type of mis-
conduct that might lead to reversal on appeal. Additionally, the 
prospect of forfeiting a bond likely would create secondary bene-
fits, such as encouraging prosecutors to protest the appointment 
of unqualified defense lawyers who might give rise to colorable 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. As a financial matter, the 
bond proposal should be appealing to state legislators because it 
would shift the costs of failed capital prosecutions away from 
state budgets and into the hands of the county actors who insti-
gated the failed prosecutions. In addition, the bond proposal 
should be particularly appealing to legislators from small coun-
ties because it re-directs some of the high appellate and postcon-
viction costs away from small counties that never use the death 
penalty to large jurisdictions that frequently seek capital pun-
ishment. 
